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Ogletree v. Navistar International
Transportation Corp.: The Demise of the
"Open and Obvious Danger" Defense

After working its way through the appellate court system for almost
a decade, the Supreme Court of Georgia made an important decision in
Ogletree v. NavistarInternationalTransportationCorp.1 by rejecting the
"open and obvious" danger rule in products liability cases and the
absolute defense it provided.'

I.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On March 10, 1984, Frank Richard Ogletree was killed while assisting
a customer in attaching a trailer to the customer's vehicle. Ogletree, an
agricultural supply salesman, sold the customer a load of ammonia
nitrate that was located in a bulk transport trailer called a "Killebrew."
After locating the correct Killebrew, Ogletree turned his back to the
customer's vehicle and stood beside an adjacent Killebrew. The
customer, whose view of Ogletree was blocked by the Killebrew,
mistakenly backed his vehicle toward the adjacent Killebrew, striking
and killing Ogletree. The customer's vehicle, which was manufactured
by Navistar International Transportation Corporation, did not have an
audible back-up alarm.3
Consequently, Ogletree's wife brought suit against Navistar for
"wrongful death, pain and suffering, and funeral, medical, and necessary
expenses of her deceased husband," asserting that Navistar negligently
failed to include an audible back-up alarm on the vehicle.4 In response,
Navistar moved for summary judgment, contending that the vehicle was
not negligently designed because "the absence of a back-up alarm was
open and obvious to any user or bystander."' The trial court granted

1. 269 Ga. 443, 500 S.E.2d 570 (1998).
2. Id. at 444, 500 S.E.2d at 571.
3. Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 194 Ga. App. 41, 42, 390 S.E.2d 61, 63
(1989).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 43, 390 S.E.2d at 64.
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Navistar's motion, and Ogletree appealed to the Georgia Court of
Appeals.'
In its first Ogletree decision ("Ogletree P), the court of appeals
considered "whether or not Navistar showed as a matter of law that it
had no duty to install the alarm or that Ogletree's injuries and death
resulted solely from his own negligence in that he assumed the risk of
injury."' The court concluded that Navistar was not precluded from
liability because "it was reasonably foreseeable to the cab and chassis
manufacturer that in normal operation, the completed product would be
backed up and there would be people behind it who were unaware of its
rearward movement towards them."8 However, four months later the
court of appeals overruled Ogletree I in Weatherby v. Honda Motor Co.,9
noting that Ogletree was "predicated upon significant errors of law"' °
because it required Navistar to prove that Mr. Ogletree had actual
knowledge of the open and obvious danger."
After the court's decision in Weatherby, Navistar appealed, claiming
that the trial court was bound by Weatherby to grant its motion for
summary judgment. 2 In its second Ogletree decision ("Ogletree IF'), the
court of appeals concluded that the trial court was bound by the law of
the case to follow Ogletree IP and again rejected Navistar's motion for
summary judgment.14 The case then proceeded to trial and the jury
returned a verdict for Ogletree in the amount of $5576." Unhappy
with the verdict, Ogletree moved for a new trial on the issue of damages.
Navistar, also unhappy with the verdict, moved for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial. 6 The trial
court granted Navistar's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict."' However, the court did not rule on Navistar's motion for a
new trial, and the case was again reviewed by the court of appeals."

6. Id. at 44, 390 S.E.2d at 65.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 47, 390 S.E.2d at 67.
9. 195 Ga. App. 169, 393 S.E.2d 64 (1990).
10. Id. at 170, 393 S.E.2d at 65.
11. Id. at 172, 393 S.E.2d at 66-67.
12. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp. v. Ogletree, 199 Ga. App. 699,699-700,405 S.E.2d 884,
885 (1991).
13. Id. at 700, 405 S.E.2d at 886.
14. Id. at 701, 405 S.E.2d at 886.
15. Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 227 Ga. App. 11, 13, 488 S.E.2d 97, 99
(1997).
16. Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 221 Ga. App. 363, 364, 471 S.E.2d 287,287
(1996).
17. Id. at 364, 471 S.E.2d at 287-88.
18. Id., 471 S.E.2d at 288.
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The court of appeals, in its third Ogletree decision ("Ogletree III"),
determined that the trial court was required to rule on both Navistar's
motion for a new trial and its motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict at the same time to save money, time, and effort, and to force the
trial court to make a decision while the case is "most fresh in the trial
court's -mind."9 The court of appeals remanded, ° and the trial court
subsequently denied Navistar's motion for a new trial.2 At this point,
both Navistar and Ogletree appealed.22
In its fourth Ogletree decision ("Ogletree IV"), the court of appeals
concluded that the evidentiary posture of the case changed between the
time Navistar moved for summary judgment after Ogletree I and the
time the jury returned a verdict for Ogletree.23 The court then affirmed
the trial court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict because
the Weatherby interpretation of the "open and obvious" rule applied.24
The ruling by the court of appeals in Ogletree IV to apply Weatherby
and the "open and obvious" rule prompted the Supreme Court of Georgia
to grant certiorari to determine whether the "open and obvious" rule
applies in design defect cases.25 In reconsidering this rule, the court
examined a number of different jurisdictions that previously held the
"open and obvious" danger rule inapplicable in design defect cases.26
The court concluded that the "open and obvious" rule, also known as the
patent danger doctrine, encourages manufacturers to eliminate safety
devices and to make hazards obvious to escape liability.27 Instead of
retaining the open and obvious rule as an absolute defense, the court
determined that it was only one of many factors to weigh in a risk-utility
formula" and that there was no justification to preclude liability for
design defect cases brought in strict liability or in negligence.29 In so
holding, the court overruled Weatherby and reversed Ogletree -V."o

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
1167,
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 364-65, 471 S.E.2d at 288.
Id. at 366, 471 S.E.2d at 289.
227 Ga. App. at 13, 488 S.E.2d at 99.
Id. at 13-14, 488 S.E.2d at 99.
Id. at 16, 488 S.E.2d at 101.
Id. at 16-17, 488 S.E.2d at 101.
269 Ga. at 444, 500 S.E.2d at 571.
Id., 500 S.E.2d at 571-72.
Id. at 445, 500 S.E.2d at 572 (citing Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d
1170 (Fla. 1979)).
Id.
Id. at 446, 500 S.E.2d at 572.
Id. at 444, 446, 500 S.E.2d at 571, 572.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

The patent danger doctrine, otherwise known as the "open and
obvious" defense, was first articulated in 1950 by the Court of Appeals

of New York in Campo v. Scofield 1 when the court stated that a
manufacturer is "under no duty to guard against injury from a patent
peril or from a source manifestly dangerous ... as long as the danger to
be avoided is obvious and patent to all."32 Twenty-one years later in
Stovall & Co. v. Tate,33 the Georgia Court of Appeals introduced the
"open and obvious" defense into Georgia law.34 In Stovall plaintiff was
hit by a rock expelled from a lawnmower while she was sitting in her
classroom.35 Plaintiff sued the manufacturer, claiming, among other
things, that the manufacturer was negligent for not providing a device
to deflect objects thrown from the mower blade." In holding that the
"open and obvious" danger rule applied, the court observed that "'there
are... on the market vast numbers of potentially dangerous products
as to which the manufacturer owes no duty of warning or other
protection. ' '3 v The court added that "[ailmost every physical object can
be inherently dangerous or potentially dangerous in a sense ....
The
law does not require him to warn of such common dangers."38
While over the next two decades other states debated the issue of
"risk-utility"39 and the "open and obvious" danger doctrine,40 Georgia

31. Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950).
32. Id. at 804.
33. 124 Ga. App. 605, 184 S.E.2d 834 (1971).
34. Id. at 610-11, 184 S.E.2d at 838 (citing Campo, 95 N.E.2d at 802).
35. Id. at 605, 184 S.E.2d at 835.
36. Id. at 609, 184 S.E.2d at 837.
37. Id. at 610, 184 S.E.2d at 837 (quoting Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d
23, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1957)).
38. Id., 184 S.E.2d at 838 (quoting Jamieson, 247 F.2d at 26).
39. In 1976, the Court of Appeals of New York discarded the "open and obvious"
defense that it had made famous. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 573 (N.Y. 1976).
The defense had been highly criticized for allowing defendant to present what amounted
to an affirmative defense of assumption of risk without bearing the burden of showing that
plaintiff had subjectively appreciated the risk. Id. at 576. The court also argued that the
manufacturer was in the best position to make safer products but that the "open and
obvious" defense allowed them to make unsafe products as long as the danger they present
is patently obvious. Id. at 577.
In the 1980s and 1990s, many jurisdictions began to incorporate "risk-utility balancing"
in products liability cases. For example, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire noted that
when "weighing utility and desirability against danger, courts should also consider whether
the risk of danger could have been reduced without significant impact on product
effectiveness and manufacturing cost." Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843,
846 (N.H. 1978). Other jurisdictions have articulated numerous factors associated with
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continued to apply the "open and obvious" defense to products liability
cases and refused to implement a risk-utility approach.4' In Ogletree
I the Georgia Court of Appeals appeared to change subtly the doctrine
by stating that the "open and obvious" danger defense should absolve a
manufacturer of liability only when it can prove that the consumer had
subjective knowledge of the danger.42 The following year, the Georgia
Court of Appeals reversed this decision in Weatherby, concluding that
Ogletree I was "predicated upon significant errors of law."41 In Weatherby plaintiffs sued Honda Motor Co. for failing to attach safety
features to the gas tank of Honda motorcycles. 4 The court stated that
"[w]hile the 'open and obvious rule' has been the subject of considerable
criticism and has been abandoned in some other jurisdictions ... it
continues to be the law in Georgia."" Thus, the court in Weatherby
overruled Ogletree 146 and determined that "[aictual knowledge by the
user of the danger posed by a product is not necessary in order to invoke
the 'open and obvious rule.'" 47
Throughout the 1990s, Georgia appellate courts applied the "open and
obvious" danger defense." In Vax v. Albany Lawn & Garden Center,4 9
for example, the court of appeals applied Weatherby in a case concerning
a consumer who was injured while operating her riding lawnmower.5"
In that case, a seven-year-old lawnmower "reared up," causing the
consumer to fall off the mower and injure her leg on its blade." The

risk-utility balancing such as "the obviousness of the danger, public knowledge and
expectation of the danger ... and the ability to eliminate or minimize the danger without
seriously impairing the product or making it unduly expensive." Radiation Tech., Inc. v.
Ware Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1983).
40. 124 Ga. App. at 610-11, 184 S.E.2d at 838.
41. 195 Ga. App. at 172, 393 S.E.2d at 67.
42. 194 Ga. App. at 44-45, 390 S.E.2d at 65.
43. 195 Ga. App. at 170, 393 S.E.2d at 65.
44. Id. at 169, 393 S.E.2d at 65.
45. Id. at 170, 393 S.E.2d at 65.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 172, 393 S.E.2d at 66-67 (emphasis in original).
48. See, e.g., Gragg v. Diebold, Inc., 198 Ga. App. 823, 824, 403 S.E.2d 229, 230 (1991)
(affirming the "open and obvious" danger doctrine in a products liability action against a
bank for failing to alert incoming customers of security problems); Floyd v. BIC Corp., 790
F. Supp. 276, 278 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (allowing a manufacturer to utilize "open and obvious"
danger defense to escape liability in a case concerning a butane lighter that was not child
proof); Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 209 Ga. App. 226, 228-29, 433 S.E.2d 67, 71 (1993)
(affirming the "open and obvious" danger doctrine in an action brought against the
manufacturer of a wood shaper).
49. 209 Ga. App. 371, 433 S.E.2d 364 (1993).
50. Id. at 371, 433 S.E.2d at 366.
51. Id., 433 S.E.2d at 365.

648

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

consumer sued the manufacturer, distributor, and retailer of the mower
"alleging claims of negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty."52
The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants and the court
of appeals affirmed, noting that "[d]espite53 criticism of the 'open and
obvious' rule, it remains law in this state."
The Supreme Court of Georgia supported "risk-utility balancing" in
54
defective design claims in a 1994 decision, Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc.
In that case, the parents of a nine-year-old child sued the manufacturer
of a rat poison, alleging that the poison had been defectively designed
and inadequately labeled.55 The jury found for plaintiffs and awarded
a large verdict, including punitive damages.5 " The court of appeals
reversed on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence to find
that the poison was inadequately labeled.57 The Supreme Court of
Georgia granted a writ of certiorari," and after reviewing treatises and
decisions from other jurisdictions, concluded that there was "a general
consensus regarding the utilization in design defect cases of a balancing
test whereby the risks inherent in a product design are weighed against
the utility or benefit derived from the product."59 The court also
observed that the risk-utility balancing test was "consistent with Georgia
law, which has long applied negligence principles in making the
determination whether a product was defectively designed. '60 Finally,
after acknowledging that the risk-utility analysis was consistent with
Georgia law, the court stated that "we hereby adopt the risk-utility
analysis. " 61
The most important portion of Banks was not found within the text of
the opinion, but rather within a footnote. Footnote six of the opinion
articulated "a non-exhaustive list of general factors derived from
numerous sources" used in implementing risk-utility balancing.62
Among these factors the court listed "the gravity and severity of the
danger posed by the design; the likelihood of that danger ... the user's
knowledge of the product, publicity surrounding the danger ... as well
as common knowledge and the expectation of danger; [and] the user's

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 372, 433 S.E.2d at 366.
264 Ga. 732, 734-35, 450 S.E.2d 671, 673-74 (1994).
Id. at 732-33, 450 S.E.2d at 672.
Id. at 733, 450 S.E.2d at 672.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 734, 450 S.E.2d at 673.
Id. at 735, 450 S.E.2d at 674.
Id.
Id. at 736, 450 S.E.2d at 675.
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ability to avoid danger."63 Because the decision did not explicitly
overrule the "open and obvious" danger defense, questions remained on
its continued viability in Georgia.
The first case to discuss the status of the "open and obvious" danger
defense after Banks was Snow v. Bellamy Manufacturing & Repair.64
In this federal case from the Northern District of Georgia, the court
analyzed Banks to determine its impact on the "open and obvious"
danger doctrine.65 In an unpublished order detailing numerous motions
presented by plaintiff and defendant, the court rejected defendant's
argument that the "open and obvious" defense precluded liability and
thus denied the manufacturer's motion for summary judgment.6 In
making this determination, the court extensively reviewed Banks to
determine whether the "open and obvious" danger rule was still
applicable.6
After reviewing the risk-utility analysis and the effect it
had on the patent danger doctrine in other jurisdictions, the court
concluded that Banks had "impliedly overruled the open and
obvious
6
doctrine as applied to products liability design defect cases."
Seven months later, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia revisited the "open and obvious" danger doctrine in
Raymond v. Amada Co.6 9 In that case a metal worker crushed his
hand in an industrial machine used to bend sheets of metal.7 ° The
metal worker sued the distributor of the machine, claiming that it was
defectively designed." The distributor responded by alleging that the
danger posed by the machine was open and obvious.72 After discussing
the risk-utility approach presented in Banks and the district court's
order in Snow, the court again determined that "Banks ha[d] impliedly
overruled the open and obvious doctrine as applied to products liability
design cases."7 3

63. Id. at 736 n.6, 450 S.E.2d at 675 n.6.
64. CIV. A. No. 1:94-CV-957-JTC, 1995 WL 867859 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 1995)
(unpublished decision).
65. Id. at *10. Plaintiff in this case was injured while exiting a mobile makeup trailer
which "had no steps, ladder, [or] handles ... to assist with entry or exit." Id. at *1.
66. Id. at *11.
67. Id. at *10.
68. Id. at *11.
69. 925 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
70. Id. at 1575.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1576.
73. Id. at 1578.
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While these federal district courts interpreted Banks to have
"impliedly overruled the open and obvious danger doctrine,"74 the
Georgia Supreme Court would not explicitly acknowledge this change
until Ogletree.75
III.

COURT'S RATIONALE

In Ogletree the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that "the 'open
and obvious danger' rule is not controlling in a case where, as here, it is
alleged that a product has a design defect."76 To support its holding,
the court referred to a number of different sources.77 First, the court
referred to the court of appeals determination in Banks that a riskutility balance should be used in design defect cases.7" Second, the
court acknowledged that numerous foreign cases and "[tihe overwhelming majority of jurisdictions" have discarded the "open and obvious"
rule.79 Third, the court referred to the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability and academic commentators who had criticized the
rule." Finally, the court provided several policy reasons to discard the
"open and obvious" rule. 8
The court rationalized its decision to discard the "open and obvious"
rule by reaffirming Banks and the risk-utility formula found therein. 2
The court noted that "the risk-utility factors which were explicitly
mentioned in Banks encompass the degree to which the danger in the
product is open and obvious." 3 Because the court acknowledged in
Banks that the open and obvious danger of a product was one of the
factors to be used in the risk-utility formula, the court held that the
"open and obvious" rule was no longer necessary.81
The court also observed that decisions from other jurisdictions had
"abandoned or rejected the obvious danger rule."" In addition, the
court was persuaded by the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability and the accompanying comments which stated that the "open

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.; Snow, 1995 WL 867859, at *11.
269 Ga. at 444, 500 S.E.2d at 571.
Id.
Id. at 443-46, 500 S.E.2d at 571-72.
Id. at 444, 500 S.E.2d at 571.
Id., 500 S.E.2d at 571-72.
Id., 500 S.E.2d at 572.
Id. at 444-45, 500 S.E.2d at 572.
Id. at 444, 500 S.E.2d at 571.
Id.
Id.

85.

Id.
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and obvious" danger rule "is not viable."" The court also relied on
reporter's notes in the Restatement which included criticism of the "open
and obvious" danger rule by academic commentators.8 7 Together with
the Banks decision to utilize the risk-utility formula, this persuasive
authority provides the backbone of the court's decision.
Finally, the court set forth numerous policy reasons for discarding the
"open and obvious" danger rule.8" The court acknowledged that "'[the
patent danger doctrine encourages manufacturers to be outrageous in
their design, to eliminate safety devices, and to make hazards obvious.'" 9 However, by discarding the "open and obvious" danger rule, the
court concluded that manufacturers would be forced to consider obvious
dangers and encouraged to eliminate them or provide safety mechanisms.90 The court also observed that the openness and obviousness of
the danger was not rendered irrelevant, but is to be utilized in the riskutility formula.91 While a defendant is still permitted to argue that the
plaintiff should have been objectively aware of the patent or obvious risk
involved in using the product, this assertion is no longer dispositive of
the liability issue.9 2
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Ogletree has caused a significant change in the defense of products
liability cases in Georgia. By explicitly rejecting the "open and obvious"
danger rule and the absolute defense that it previously provided, the
court has evinced a willingness to align itself with the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability and a majority of other jurisdictions.93 The decision is also a logical extension of the risk-utility
formula first presented in Banks. 94 Banks opened the door to Ogletree
by articulating a number of factors to be used by courts when analyzing
a products liability claim. 95 The nonexhaustive list of factors presented
in Banks appeared to include the extent to which a product was patently
dangerous." However, because that issue was not on appeal in Banks,

86. Id., 500 S.E.2d at 572.
87. Id. at 444-45, 500 S.E.2d at 572.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 445, 500 S.E.2d at 572 (quoting Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So.
2d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 1979)).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 444, 500 S.E.2d at 571-72.
94. 264 Ga. at 734-35, 450 S.E.2d at 673-74.
95. Id. at 736 & n.6, 450 S.E.2d at 675 & n.6.
96. Id. at 736 n.6, 450 S.E.2d at 675 n.6.
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it was left for a future case. Ogletree provided the court with the
opportunity.
The decision in Ogletree was appropriate when considered in relation
to the risk-utility formula. The court's holding does not destroy the
"open and obvious" danger defense; it simply ensures that the defense
is no longer absolute. Defendants will be allowed to present evidence
showing that a product has an open and obvious danger, and this
evidence will be considered by the jury. However, this evidence will
comprise only one of the risk-utility factors considered by the jury and
the court.98 For purposes of the risk-utility analysis, the court apparently concluded that a defendant can present evidence to show whether
the plaintiff objectively should have been aware of the obvious danger.9 9
Because this objective awareness is only one of the factors to weigh in
a risk-utility formula, it is no longer an absolute defense. °°
On the other hand, it appears that an "open and obvious" danger can
still be used as an absolute defense if a defendant can prove that the
plaintiff appreciated the open or obvious danger and assumed the risk.
This places a heavier burden on the defendant because the defendant
must show that the plaintiff subjectively realized and assumed the risk.
While the court in Ogletree did not discuss the effect that its decision
would have on the assumption of the risk defense, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia has concluded that it
remains a viable defense in products liability cases. 01 As long as a
defendant can show that the plaintiff subjectively appreciated the
obvious danger or risk, "it is not inherently inconsistent with risk-utility
from recovering
balancing to hold that [he] ... should be prevented
10 2

against the manufacturer for a resulting injury."
The decision is also important because it has the potential to affect the
way in which products are manufactured. Because manufacturers are
in the best position to protect consumers, Ogletree will encourage them
to produce safer products by designing out, or providing guards against,
open and obvious dangers. With the abolition of the "open and obvious"
danger defense, plaintiffs will be able to assert freely that the danger
was open and obvious and could have been easily corrected by the
manufacturer. This will force manufacturers to examine carefully the
costs and benefits of providing certain safety mechanisms.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

269 Ga. at 445, 500 S.E.2d at 572.
Id.
Id.
Id.
925 F. Supp. at 1579.
Id. at 1578.

1999]

OGLETREE V. NAVISTAR

653

Finally, the decision will help plaintiffs survive motions for summary
judgment and allow them to present their cases to a jury. In fact, only
four months after the court rejected the "open and obvious" rule, the
Georgia Court of Appeals applied Ogletree in Zeigler v. CloWhite Co.'0'
and determined that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
for a manufacturer.' °4 In that case, defendant manufactured lemonscented bleach that injured a consumer. The consumer claimed that the
lemon-scent masked the toxicity of the bleach and its fumes." 5 The
court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision, stating that "an open
and obvious danger did not preclude an action against the manufacturer
of a product" because it was only one factor used in the risk-utility
analysis.' 6
In conclusion, Ogletree has continued the transformation of Georgia
products liability law in design defect cases by rejecting the longstanding
"open and obvious" danger defense. It also reflects the court's decision
to align itself with the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
and a majority of other jurisdictions. The decision will encourage
manufacturers to examine safety issues and will allow plaintiffs a better
opportunity to present their case before a jury.
RICHARD L. SIZEMORE

103.
104.
105.
106.

234 Ga. App. 627, 507 S.E.2d 182 (1998).
Id. at 627, 507 S.E.2d at 183.
Id.
Id. at 628, 507 S.E.2d at 184.

